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SHEDDING LIGHT ON THE “GOING DARK” PROBLEM AND
THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE
John Mylan Traylor*
ABSTRACT
In an effort to protect the enormous volume of sensitive and valuable data that
travels across the Internet and is stored on personal devices, private companies
have created encryption software to secure data from criminals, hackers, and ter-
rorists who wish to steal it. The greatest benefit of encryption also creates the biggest
problem: Encryption software has become so secure that often not even the govern-
ment can bypass it. The “Going Dark” problem—a scenario in which the
government has obtained the legal authority to search a suspected criminal’s en-
crypted device but lacks the technical ability to do so—is becoming increasingly
common. In response, the government has resorted to obtaining court orders to com-
pel private companies to assist it in bypassing encrypted devices, in some cases
demanding that companies create entirely new software to accomplish this task.
This raises a plethora of political, economic, and legal questions. This Note argues
that given the weighty interests on all sides of the debate and the widespread effects
that these cases will have, the encryption issue should be decided by the legislative
branch instead of the courts. Because of the complexity of these issues and the lack
of current legislation, the courts are being forced to stretch the law in ways that will
likely lead to inconsistent and undesirable rulings. This Note advocates that the
best method for Congress to solve this problem is to create an administrative body
with rule-making, investigative, and adjudicative powers to address these situa-
tions on a case-by-case basis and to advise Congress on future legislation regarding
encryption and digital security in general.
INTRODUCTION
People worldwide have become increasingly reliant on
smartphones, tablets and personal computers, so much so that
these devices have become an integral part of everyday life. Individ-
uals store data including private conversations, photos, financial
information, health data, passwords, places of residence, informa-
tion regarding the whereabouts of themselves and others, and
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many other forms of extremely personal information on these de-
vices.1 These hubs of personal information attract criminals and
hackers who wish to use such information without the consent of
the owner. In an effort to protect individuals’ personal information,
private companies spend a considerable amount of time and re-
sources encrypting it.
The greatest benefit of encryption also creates the biggest prob-
lem: private companies are very good at preventing third parties
from bypassing their encryptions. While this can be advantageous
for law-abiding citizens who need to be protected from hackers, it
can be dangerous when criminals and terrorists are able to use the
same encryption methods to communicate secretly, hide evidence,
and otherwise evade authorities and commit crimes. Problems and
conflicts arise when the government seeks to obtain this informa-
tion for the purposes of investigating or thwarting crimes but
cannot bypass the encryption of the device where the information is
stored. Companies have become so skilled at creating device en-
cryption that the government is often unable to access encrypted
information even when it has the accompanying devices in its pos-
session.2 Recently, the government has resorted to compelling the
assistance of private companies to decrypt, or unlock, devices by
obtaining court orders pursuant to the authority of the All Writs Act
of 1789 (“AWA”).3 These companies have recently started resisting
these orders on two grounds. First, private companies argue that
the government’s interpretation of the AWA is incorrect because
the statute does not actually grant the government the power to
compel private actors to assist in decrypting devices. Second, com-
panies argue that compelling them to do so is unconstitutional.
This Note analyzes the competing interests in the context of de-
vice encryption, describes the inadequacy of current law, and
suggests a legislative solution to the existing conflicts and issues.
Part I describes the basic workings of encryption, the “Going Dark”
1. See generally Thom File & Camille Ryan, Computer and Internet Use in the United States:
2013, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1, 1 (Nov. 2014), https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/2013com
puteruse.pdf.
2. See generally Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, In re Matter of
the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black
Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 5:16-cm-00010-SP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3,
2016) (exemplifying a circumstance in which the government cannot access an encrypted
device despite having acquired a search warrant and the encrypted device).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012); Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search,
In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search
Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 5:16-cm-00010-SP
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2016).
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problem, and the tension between device encryption and the gov-
ernment’s interest in upholding national security. Part I also
explores the recent court case between Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and describes its signifi-
cance to this issue. Part II analyzes the current state of United States
law regarding device encryption. Part II also examines relevant case
law and the United States Constitution to determine the limits of
the government’s power to compel the assistance of private compa-
nies to decrypt devices. Part III advocates that Congress pass new
legislation, creating an administrative body equipped with rulemak-
ing ability and adjudicative powers to determine on a case-by-case
basis when private companies must assist the government in
decrypting devices.
I. COMPETING INTERESTS: PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN
REGARD TO ENCRYPTION
A. Background Information on Encryption and Its Importance
Encryption is commonly defined as “the conversion or encoding
of information for transmission so as to prevent interpretation with-
out the key for decryption.”4 Encryption enhances the security of a
device by scrambling its contents so that only someone with the cor-
rect encryption key can decipher them.5 Encryption is generally
regarded as the most effective way to protect confidential informa-
tion.6 According to Dave Anderson, senior director of Voltage
Security, an encryption technology provider, “[w]hen properly im-
plemented, encryption provides essentially unbreakable security.”7
Device encryption is such a popular means of securing confidential
information that technology companies constantly compete to have
more secure products to respond to consumer demand.8 Some
companies focus exclusively on digital security and encryption, such
4. CHRISTOPHER G. MORRIS, ACADEMIC PRESS DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE 743 (Amy Rosen et
al. eds., 1992).
5. See Encryption, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/TrustCenter/Secur-
ity/Encryption (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
6. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Encryption Still Best Way to Protect Data—Despite NSA, COM-
PUTERWORLD, http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484714/security0/encryption-still-
best-way-to-protect-data——despite-nsa.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
7. Id.
8. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae for Amazon.com, Box, Cisco Systems, Dropbox,
Evernote, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, Nest, Pinterest, Slack, Snapchat, Whatsapp,
and Yahoo in support of Apple Inc. at 1–5, 18, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized
During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate
35KGD20, No. CM 16–10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2016) (describing the high consumer demand
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as companies like Symantec Corporation, while others, such as Ap-
ple, develop their own encryption technologies and use them in
conjunction with their own products.9
As technology advances, sophisticated hackers and cyber-
criminals are becoming increasingly effective at bypassing
encryption and cyber intrusions are increasing in frequency.10 The
cost of having weak encryption, or failing to encrypt at all, can be
devastating. For example, in 2007, cybercriminals gained access to
more than 100 million credit and debit card numbers from Heart-
land Payment Systems, Inc.11 In October 2014, attackers hacked
Sony Pictures and released confidential information ranging from
employee personal data to documents about the company’s upcom-
ing projects.12 While it was never confirmed, the FBI presented
evidence that North Korea was behind this attack on Sony Pictures,
but also noted, according to CNN, that “[a]nyone could have pul-
led this off . . . . It could have been a disgruntled Sony Employee,
profit-seeking hackers, North Korea—or the combination of the
three.”13
Even more recently, the government itself was hacked when the
Office of Personnel Management was hacked by criminals in 2015,
putting millions of Americans’ personal information at risk.14 The
breach, which constitutes the largest cyberattack on the United
States government in history, resulted in the theft of sensitive infor-
mation from 21.5 million people, including addresses, health and
financial history, fingerprints, and other information.15 When asked
about the significance of the breach, James B. Comey, director of
for digital security and consumers’ expectations of secure data from major technology com-
panies and their products) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae 1].
9. See, e.g., SYMANTEC CORP., www.symantec.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2016) (Symantec
Corp. is a corporation focused on digital security, whereas companies like Apple create en-
cryption and security protocols for their other devices).
10. Cyber Crime, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber
(last visited Oct. 29, 2016) (“Cyber intrusions are becoming more commonplace, more dan-
gerous, and more sophisticated.”).
11. Danny Yadron, Companies Wrestle with the Cost of Cybersecurity, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 25,
2014, 11:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230483470457940342153
9734550.
12. Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/the-sony-pictures-hack-
explained/.
13. Jose Pagliery, What Caused Sony Hack: What We Know Now, CNN: MONEY (Dec. 29
2014, 1:58 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/24/technology/security/sony-hack-facts/.
14. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Million People,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/office-of-personnel-
management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html.
15. Id.
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the FBI, stated, “[It] is a treasure trove of information about every-
body who has worked for, tried to work for or works for the United
States government . . . . Just imagine you are an intelligence service
and you had that data, how it would be useful to you.”16 Such infor-
mation could be used or sold to those who seek to harm the victims
of the theft or to infiltrate other governmental operations. These
examples highlight the ease and frequency with which hackers are
able to take advantage of weak encryption and cybersecurity
systems.
Thus, both private companies and the government invest a sub-
stantial amount of time, money, and personnel to continuously
make encryption systems stronger to stay one step ahead of hackers.
Creating and updating encryption systems is no easy task; it re-
quires that the software be designed, created, tested, validated, and
deployed, which all take significant time and skilled technicians to
accomplish.17 As a result of this investment, encryption has become
so effective that it has caused an entirely new problem: criminals,
hackers and terrorist can use the same encryption to their
advantage.
B. The “Going Dark” Problem
The “Going Dark” problem, a phrase coined in the 1990s, refers
to situations in which the government has legally obtained the right
to search certain devices, but “lacks the technical ability to carry out
those orders because of a fundamental shift in communications ser-
vices and technologies.”18 According to the FBI, the Going Dark
problem presents a huge obstacle for law enforcement trying to
conduct investigations.19 FBI Director James Comey commented on
the Going Dark problem by stating that “[a]rmed with lawful au-
thority, we increasingly find ourselves simply unable to do that
which the courts have authorized us to do, and that is to collect
information being transmitted by terrorists, by criminals, by
pedophiles, by bad people of all sorts.”20
16. Id.
17. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae 1, supra note 8.
18. Going Dark, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/operation
al-technology/going-dark (last visited Oct. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Going Dark].
19. See id.
20. Id.
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The FBI also claims that these problems are exacerbated in time-
sensitive situations when decrypting a device could lead to thwart-
ing or preventing a crime or saving lives.21 In order to overcome the
Going Dark problem, the government has resorted to using the
courts to obtain orders to compel private companies to assist them
in their decryption efforts.22
C. Competing Interests
The government’s demand that private companies assist it in ac-
cessing encrypted devices has created extreme tension between the
competing interests of those involved. These interests include those
of the government and law enforcement, encryption companies,
and the many individuals who rely so heavily on these devices.23 The
relevant competing interests include national security in terms of
public safety, the potential backdoor problem,24 privacy, national
security in terms of data security, and the constitutional concerns
that will be covered in Part II. In order to find the proper solution
to this problem, it is first necessary to consider the weighty interests
on all sides of the debate.
1. National Security: Public Safety
In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights, New York Uni-
versity School of Law professor Richard A. Epstein stated, “No one
can doubt the legitimate needs of law enforcement officials at the
federal, state and local levels to monitor the high tech criminal ac-
tivities that threaten the security of this nation, the liberty of the
21. See id.
22. The government has also resorted to requesting that the courts authorize orders
compelling suspects themselves to input their own passcodes or otherwise unlock their per-
sonal devices. This raises serious constitutional questions, such as a potential violation of the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. This Note focuses on the government
compelling companies to provide assistance and does not address individuals being com-
pelled to unlock their devices. For more information on this issue, see RICHARD M.
THOMPSON II & CHRIS JAIKARAN, ENCRYPTION: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 6–16 (Mar. 3, 2016).
23. See Tim Cook, Answers to Your Questions about Apple and Security, APPLE (last visited
Oct. 29, 2016), http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/answers/.
24. The backdoor problem refers to the belief that if a company creates software that
can decrypt its encryption software, any party that obtains the software can use it, and so if
the software is stolen or otherwise falls into the wrong hands, it can be extremely dangerous.
The backdoor problem is covered in more detail in Part I.C.2 Private Actors’ Data Security
and “Backdoor” Concerns.
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citizens within it, and the security and safety of the property they
own.”25 Criminals and terrorists alike use encrypted devices because
of the difficulty the government has decrypting them.26 For exam-
ple, at the state level, according to Cyrus Vance, the Manhattan
District Attorney, “[m]ore than 120 Manhattan criminal cases have
been harmed by the failure to execute search warrants on the latest
smartphones.”27 Vance even noted that there were several occasions
in which “average criminal[s]” informed their associates that only
the latest encryption software (iOS 8 at the time), would prevent
law enforcement from decrypting devices.28 Furthermore, the Fed-
eral Law Enforcement Officers Association noted that in an
intercepted phone call from a New York prison, an inmate referred
to Apple iPhone encryption software as a “gift from god” because
authorities were powerless to decrypt it.29
This problem is not limited to domestic crimes. For example, as
reported by the Washington Post, FBI Director James Comey stated,
“[t]he Islamic State terrorist group is increasingly using encrypted
communications to recruit troubled Americans and urge them to
carry out attacks . . .”30 According to Comey, the Islamic State oper-
atives post on social media outlets such as Twitter to attract
potential recruits.31 Once the operatives locate a potential recruit,
they instruct him or her to use an encrypted mobile messaging app,
at which point the FBI is no longer able to intercept messages or
otherwise monitor their activity; all further communication be-
tween operatives and potential recruits becomes undetectable to
25. Hearing before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights,
http://www.computerprivacy.org/archive/03171998-3.shtml (last visited Oct. 29 2016) (Tes-
timony by Richard A. Epstein, on behalf of Americans for Computer Privacy) [hereinafter
Epstein Testimony].
26. Mark Berman, Police Say Criminals View iPhones as ‘Another Gift from God’ Because of the
Encryption, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation
/wp/2016/03/18/police-backing-the-fbi-in-fight-with-apple-say-criminals-love-iphones-and-
call-the-encryption-a-gift-from-god/?utm_term=.108ee70af494.
27. Jonathan Atler, Manhattan DA: Smartphone Encryption Foiled 120 Criminal Cases, THE
DAILY BEAST (Dec. 28, 2015, 12:13 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/
28/manhattan-da-smartphone-encryption-foiled-120-criminal-cases.html.
28. Id.
29. Dan Levine, Police Say Criminals Like Apple iPhones Because of Encryption, REUTERS,
(Mar. 4, 2016, 10:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-police-idUS
KCN0W62AP.
30. Ellen Nakashima, FBI chief: Terrorist Group Turning to Encrypted Communications, WASH.
POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-chief-ter
ror-group-turning-to-encrypted-communications/2015/07/08/89167f74-2579-11e5-aae2-6c4f
59b050aa_story.html.
31. Id.
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the FBI.32  The Washington Post noted that Comey stated to Con-
gress that “the Islamic State has attracted at least 21,000 English-
speaking followers on Twitter, bombarding them with incitements
to violence.”33 Thus, FBI officials advocate for the ability to compel
private companies to provide reasonable assistance to help mini-
mize these substantial national security risks.34
2. Private Actors’ Data Security and “Backdoor” Concerns
Private individuals and corporations have a strong interest in
data security. Individuals store a wealth of private information on
their various electronic devices including, “financial records and
credit card information, health information, location data, calen-
dars, personal and political beliefs, family photographs, [and]
information about their children” that if stolen by hackers could
put them and their loved ones at risk.35 According to a report from
the Ponemon Institute, “[a]n estimated 47 percent of all American
adults have been affected by data breaches over the last year [2013],
with an estimated 432 million online accounts being affected.”36
Companies are vulnerable to cybercrime as well; in fact, according
to the FBI, “companies are the primary victims of cyber intrusions
. . . .”37 Indeed, in 2014, Target Corporation was the victim of one of
the largest breaches of consumer data in American history when
hackers gained access to over 40 million customer accounts, which
included information such as credit and debit card numbers.38
Since Target’s data breach, major data breaches have been dis-
covered almost every month, including breaches of several large
companies including Michaels Stores, Sally Beauty Supply, Neiman
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally Going Dark, supra note 18.
35. Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search and Op-
position to Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance, In re Matter of the Search of an
Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300,
California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 5:16-cm-00010-SP, at 2–3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2016)
[hereinafter Motion to Vacate].
36. B. Dan Berger, Cybercrime Thrives Amid Lack of National Data Security Standards for Re-
tailer, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/b-dan-berger/
cybercrime-thrives-amid-l_b_5503936.html.
37. Cyber Security, Terrorism, and Beyond: Addressing Evolving Threats to the Homeland: State-
ment Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2014) (Statement of
Robert Anderson, Jr., Executive Assistant Director, Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services
Branch of the FBI), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/cyber-security-terrorism-and-be
yond-addressing-evolving-threats-to-the-homeland.
38. Gregory Wallace, Target Credit Card Hack: What You Need to Know, CNN: MONEY (Dec.
23, 2013) http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/22/news/companies/target-credit-card-hack/.
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Marcus, AOL, eBay, and P.F. Chang’s Chinese Bistro.39 According
to a report from Intel Security and the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, “[c]ybercrime is costing the global economy
$575 billion and the U.S. economy $100 billion annually . . . mak-
ing the U.S. the hardest hit of any country.”40 The increased threat
of cybercrime led companies such as Apple, Google, and Facebook
to begin encrypting their devices and communication platforms by
default beginning in 2014.41
The government’s request to compel companies to create new
software to bypass its own encryption may lead to what many com-
panies and cryptology experts are referring to as a “backdoor” or
master key.42 Apple stated in a letter to its customers:
The government suggests this tool could only be used once,
on one phone. But that’s simply not true. Once created, the
technique could be used over and over again, on any number
of devices. In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of
a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of
locks.43
Several leaders in the technology industry, including Amazon.com,
Box, Cisco Systems, Dropbox, Evernote, Facebook, Google,
Microsoft, Mozilla, Nest, Pinterest, Slack, Snapchat, Whatsapp, and
Yahoo, filed a brief in which they collectively supported Apple’s
claim that the government’s action would necessarily lead to the
creation of a backdoor.44 According to a group of leading cryptog-
raphers and computer scientists, “[a]ny trap door system increases
the risk that someone else will be able to find, duplicate or manu-
facture the key to the encrypted information.”45
Furthermore, these companies and Apple argue that neither Ap-
ple nor the government could guarantee the safety of this software
because creating the backdoor creates an extremely high risk that
criminals, terrorists, or even foreign countries will obtain and use
the backdoor to harm the government, citizens, or the companies
39. Berger, supra note 36.
40. Id.
41. See THOMPSON & JAIKARAN, supra note 22, at 1.
42. See Letter from Tim Cook, CEO, Apple, to Our Customers, Answers to Your Questions about
Apple and Security (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/[hereinafter Letter
from Tim Cook].
43. Id.
44. Brief of Amici Curiae 1, supra note 8.
45. Epstein Testimony, supra note 25 (citing The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and
Trusted Third-Party Encryption: Leading Cryptographers and Computer Scientists Report Says Govern-
ment Encryption Plan is Risky and Impractical) (full citation omitted).
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themselves.46 In short, these companies claim that the risk in creat-
ing a backdoor is that once created, it is too difficult to secure it
and to ensure that no one else comes through it.47
The aforementioned technology leaders and Apple also claim
that—aside from the security issues—creating a backdoor is an ex-
tremely burdensome and costly process.48
Apple claims the government’s unprecedented demand requires
that it develop new software that will destroy the security features
Apple has spent years creating.49 According to Apple, no current
operating system can accomplish what the government desires, and
any effort to create such an operating system requires that Apple
write new code, rather than simply disabling the functionality of
existing software.50 In its Motion to Vacate, Apple stated:
Experienced Apple engineers would have to design, create,
test, and validate the compromised operating system, using a
hyper-secure isolation room within which to do it, and then
deploy and supervise its operation by the FBI to brute force
crack the phone’s passcode. The system itself would have to be
tested on multiple devices to ensure that the operating system
works and does not alter any data on the device. All aspects of
the development and testing processes would need to be
logged and recorded in case Apple’s methodology is ever
questioned.51
Finally, Apple and other technology leaders have a strong inter-
est in ensuring the security of hundreds of millions of customers
who depend on them.52 The government forcing these companies
to weaken their own encryptions will cause their customers to lose
confidence in these companies’ ability to protect user data from
criminals, hackers, and terrorists, as well as the government.53
46. See Brief of Amici Curiae 1, supra note 8, at 18–21.
47. See id.
48. Cf. Motion to Vacate, supra note 35, at 23.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 23–24.
52. Id. at 23.
53. See Brief of Amici Curiae 1, supra note 8, at 18–21; see also Brief Of Amici Curiae
Airbnb, Inc.; Atlassian Pty. Ltd.; Automattic Inc.; Cloudflare, Inc.; Ebay Inc.; Github, Inc.;
Kickstarter, Pbc; Linkedin Corporation; Mapbox Inc.; A Medium Corporation; Meetup, Inc.;
Reddit, Inc.; Square, Inc.; Squarespace, Inc.; Twilio Inc.; Twitter, Inc.; and Wickr Inc. at
13–15, In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 5:16-cm-
00010-SP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2016), http://images.apple.com/pr/pdf/Airbnb_Atlassian
_Automattic_CloudFlare_eBay_GitHub_Kickstarter_LinkedIn_Mapbox_Medium_Meetup_
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3. National Security: Data Security54
The government has a very strong interest in upholding national
security, and that interest necessarily requires strong encryption.
The FBI webpage states, “[t]he FBI supports strong encryption, and
we know firsthand the damage that can be caused by vulnerable
and insecure systems. The government uses strong encryption to
secure its own electronic information, and it encourages the private
sector and members of the public to do the same.”55 Secretary of
Defense Ashton B. Carter noted at an annual computer security
conference in San Francisco: “Data security, including encryption,
is absolutely essential to the Pentagon.”56 Furthermore, Mr. Carter
made it clear that he is “more interested in securing data than pry-
ing into it.”57 Like all private citizens and companies, the
government is also at risk from hackers, criminals, and terrorists
that seek to steal private information.
The government itself has had problems in the past with data
security. As discussed earlier in this Note, the federal government—
specifically the Office of Personnel Management—fell victim to a
breach of government computer systems in 2015 that resulted in
the theft of the personal information of approximately 21.5 million
people.58  In the hacking, 19.7 million people who had undergone
government background checks in the past and 1.8 million others,
including spouses and friends, had their personal information sto-
len.59 In a separate but related hacking, 4.2 million federal
Reddit_Square_Squarespace_Twilio_Twitter_and_Wickr.pdf [hereinafter Brief of Amici Cu-
riae 2].
54. The government also has an interest in the international consequences of the
United States’ ultimate decision on this issue. This Note does not explore these questions or
the issues regarding international diplomacy problems regarding device encryption.
However, such problems are discussed in Brief Of Amici Curiae Access Now and Wickr
Found. In Support Of Apple Inc.’s Motion To Vacate (In the Matter of the Search of an
Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS3000,
California License Plate 35KGD20) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016). The government also has an
interest in preserving the separation of powers doctrine by ensuring that the correct branch
determines the ultimate outcome of this matter and that no branch is overstepping its
constitutional authority. This Note will address those concerns and ultimately advocate that
the legislative branch is the proper authority to determine this issue in Part III.
55. Going Dark, supra note 18.
56. Michael D. Shear & David E. Sanger, Competing Interests on Encryption Divide Top
Obama Officials, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/us/politics
/competing-interests-on-encryption-divide-top-obama-officials.html.
57. Id.
58. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Million People,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/office-of-personnel-
management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html.
59. Id.; see also Tom Risen, Top FBI Attorney Worried About WhatsApp Encryption, U.S. NEWS
(Apr. 5, 2016, 5:43 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-04-05/top-fbi-attorney-
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employees also had their personal information stolen.60 These coor-
dinated breaches constitute the largest known cyberattack on the
systems of the United States government.61
It is clear that the government has a strong interest in the preser-
vation of national security by having both the means to access
encrypted devices and the ability to use stronger encryption to se-
cure its own sensitive information. Administrative officials stated,
“The United States government firmly supports the development
and robust adoption of strong encryption, which is a key tool to
secure commerce and trade, safeguard private information, pro-
mote free expression and association . . . . At the same time,
encryption poses a grave challenge for our national security and law
enforcement professionals.”62 This challenge—the government’s
difficulty bypassing the encrypted devices of suspected criminals,
hackers, and terrorists—is fueled by the fact that whenever advance-
ments in device encryption can be used to better protect public and
private users, criminals, hackers, and terrorists can usually also use
the same technology for more unsavory purposes.
Some government officials claim that both interests can be ac-
complished and are not mutually exclusive.63 Other officials claim
that allowing the government to more easily bypass encrypted de-
vices necessarily weakens encryption and that promoting stronger
encryption necessarily exposes the government to the aforemen-
tioned national security risks; in other words, that both interests
cannot be reconciled.64 The Justice Department and the FBI are
advocating for a compromise in the form of promoting strong en-
cryption “with limits” to advance both interests.65 The difficulty lies
in determining what the limits should be and whether such a com-
promise can truly accomplish both interests.
james-baker-worried-about-whatsapp-encryption?int=A6f909 (FBI general counsel stated that
“stronger encryption can also benefit the government.” Risen added that Baker concluded by
“noting that data about himself and his family were exposed during a massive Office of Per-
sonal Management breach that affected an estimated 21.5 million federal employees or job
applicants”).
60. Davis, supra note 58; see also Risen, supra note 59.
61. Davis, supra note 58; see also Risen, supra note 59.
62. Shear & Sanger, supra note 56.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
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C. Case Study: San Bernardino Case
The issue of device encryption has resurfaced in the form of the
FBI demanding, via a court order, that Apple, a private company,
assist in its investigation of a terrorist attack that took place in San
Bernardino, California. In In re the Matter of the Search of an Apple
iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus
IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203,66 (“San Bernardino case”),
the FBI persuaded the court to grant a Motion to Compel Apple to
reasonably assist in the FBI’s investigation by decrypting Syed
Rizwan Farook’s Apple iPhone to obtain personal information that
might relate to his participation in the terrorist incident. Though in
the past Apple has complied with such orders, it recently decided to
appeal the court’s ruling, claiming that “[t]he U.S. government has
asked us [Apple] for something we simply do not have, and some-
thing we consider too dangerous to create. They have asked us to
build a backdoor to the iPhone.”67 According to Apple, the govern-
ment’s actions constitute an overreach of its authority and an
attempt to subvert the law-making process by using the courts as a
means to authorize its actions as opposed to using the normal law-
making process.68 Apple further contends that being forced to cre-
ate a backdoor would not only put its users at risk, but would
undermine the very encryption systems it has gone to such great
lengths to create.
66. Government’s Motion to Compel Apple Inc. to Comply with this Court’s February
16, 2016 Order Compelling Assistance in Search at 22, In re Search of an Apple iPhone
Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License
Plate 35KGD203, No. CM 16-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Government’s Motion
to Compel]. https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/file/826836/download.
67. See Letter from Tim Cook, CEO, Apple, to Our Customers, Answers to Your Ques-
tions about Apple and Security (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/
 [hereinafter Letter from Tim Cook].
68. Several months after this matter arose, the FBI claimed that it was eventually able to
unlock the iPhone without Apple’s assistance and has since dropped its demand. See Devlin
Barrett & Daisuke Wakabayashi, FBI Opens San Bernardino Shooter’s iPhone; U.S. Drops Demand
on Apple, WALL STREET J., (Mar. 28, 2016, 10:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-un-
locks-terrorists-iphone-without-apples-help-1459202353. While the parties are no longer
arguing about this specific case, the legal issues at the core of this debate are far from re-
solved. See id. There are still multiple similar cases between Apple and the FBI pending.
Furthermore, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, Eric Berg, special counsel for Foley &
Lardner communicated that  “[T]echnology companies [will continue] to make their devices
harder to crack with each iteration. In time, another case will test the issues of privacy and
security again . . .” Indeed, Berg believes that “ ‘[i]t’s only a matter of time.’” Id.
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1. The Significance of the San Bernardino Case
The San Bernardino case is significant because it is the first case
in which the government attempted to bypass encryption by de-
manding that a private company create entirely new software in
order to do so. In its attempt to heighten encryption security, Apple
released a new operating system called iOS 8, which effectively pre-
vented Apple itself from being able to decrypt devices running iOS
software.69 Once any Apple device is running iOS 8 or a later up-
date, not even Apple can access the information stored on the
locked device as opposed to before the update, when Apple had the
ability to decrypt devices running iOS software.70 In its letter to its
consumers, Apple stated, “We have even put that data out of our
own reach, because we believe the contents of your iPhone are
none of our business.”71
The iPhone in the San Bernardino case, unlike the other cases, is
running iOS 8, and therefore the only way Apple or the govern-
ment would be able to access the device is by creating an entirely
new program to decrypt it, commonly referred to as a backdoor.72
In other words, whereas in the past Apple had access to the infor-
mation and could simply hand it over to the government, it is now
being asked to create a new program that would subvert its own
security measures and thereby give the government the information
it seeks. As this Note will explain, there are significantly different
legal implications when the government requests that a private
company create entirely new software as opposed to when it simply
requests information the private company already has in its
possession.
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
This Part addresses the sources of law that might authorize the
government to compel private actors to assist it in bypassing device
encryption. This Part also addresses whether the applicable statutes
are being applied constitutionally and other relevant constitutional
concerns. This Part concludes by commenting on the difficulty
69. Tim Cook, Answers to Your Questions About Apple and Security, APPLE, http://
www.apple.com/customer-letter/answers/(last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
70. Andrew Hart, Apple Will No Longer Unlock iOS Devices For Police, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/17/apple-unlock-devices-police_
n_5840064.html (explaining the different features included in iOS 8, notably that Apple it-
self no longer has the ability to decrypt its devices).
71. Cook, supra note 69.
72. See Letter from Tim Cook, supra note 42.
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courts have applying the limited and antiquated statutes and case
law surrounding this issue.
A. What Source of Law Might Authorize the Government to Compel
Private Companies to Provide Assistance to Bypass Device
Encryption?
The two primary statutes at issue are the AWA and the Communi-
cations Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”).73 In the
several cases in which the government has demanded the assistance
of private companies to bypass device encryption, it has relied on
the authority of the AWA. The Supreme Court has noted that
“where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it
is that authority, not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.”74 The
AWA is considered to be a “gap-filler” and was created to endow the
courts with “broad statutory authority to ensure they could effec-
tively carry out the duties of an independent judiciary by issuing the
orders necessary to do so—even if Congress had not had the fore-
sight to create all of the procedural mechanisms that might be
required.”75
Apple argues that CALEA applies to the matter at hand and is
therefore controlling instead of the AWA. Conversely, the govern-
ment argues that the AWA is controlling. The issue is whether
CALEA addresses the specific matter at hand, or if instead the AWA
is controlling because neither CALEA nor any other statute directly
addresses this matter. Because the AWA only applies in the absence
of any other controlling statute, it is first necessary to determine
whether or not CALEA applies in this situation.
1. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA)
In 1994, Congress passed CALEA to address its concern that
“new and emerging telecommunications technologies pose
problems for law enforcement.”76 CALEA has several limitations re-
garding what the government can and cannot compel third parties
73. 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
74. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
75. See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant
Issued by This Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 350 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2016).
76. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, pt. 1, at 14 (1994).
504 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:2
to do when providing technological assistance.77 In short, “CALEA
requires telecommunications carriers to retain the ability to comply
with court orders for real-time interceptions and call-identifying
information.”78
In the San Bernardino Case, Apple argued that CALEA explicitly
prohibits the government from compelling companies like Apple to
decrypt devices and, therefore, that the government is precluded
from using the AWA to circumvent CALEA.79 CALEA states that the
government cannot compel a provider of an “electronic communi-
cation service” to adopt any specific design of its equipment,
facilities, services or system configuration.80 Apple argues that it is
“unquestionably a provider of electronic communications services
through the various messaging services it provides to its customers
through iPhones.”81 Thus, Apple argues the government cannot re-
quire it to create new software, as that would constitute adopting a
specific design of its equipment, facilities, services or system config-
uration.82 According to Apple, because CALEA specifically
prohibits this, the government cannot use the AWA to circumvent
CALEA.
Apple further argued that applying the AWA here would be “in-
consistent with the intent of Congress.”83 Apple noted that CALEA
contains mandatory assistance provisions, which list the types of ac-
tors that must assist the government. Apple stated, “CALEA
intentionally excludes information services providers like Apple,
from the scope of its mandatory assistance provisions.”84 Apple con-
tended that because Apple does not fall into one of the categories
of actors listed, Congress did not intend for the government to be
able to compel companies like Apple to assist it.85 Indeed, in an-
other similar case involving the FBI compelling Apple to assist it,
the district court noted, “CALEA . . . is part of a larger legislative
scheme that is so comprehensive as to imply a prohibition against
imposing requirements on private entities such as Apple that the
77. See 47 U.S.C. § 1001–1002.
78. Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, In re Matter of the Search
of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus
IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 5:16-cm-00010-SP, at 21–22 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3,
2016).
79. See id. at 25–26; see also Motion to Vacate, supra note 35, at 15–19.
80. See THOMPSON & JAIKARAN, supra note 22, at 25–26; see also Motion to Vacate, supra
note 35, at 15–19.
81. Motion to Vacate, supra note 35, at 16.
82. Id. at 17.
83. See THOMPSON & JAIKARAN, supra note 22, at 26; see also Motion to Vacate, supra note
35, at 15–19.
84. Motion to Vacate, supra note 35, at 17.
85. See id. at 15–19.
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statute does not affirmatively prescribe.”86 Apple therefore argues
that even if CALEA does not explicitly prohibit the government
from compelling Apple to assist it, because Congress has indicated
its intent to “allow strong encryption” and to prevent the govern-
ment from “mandating that such encryption schemes contain a
back door,” the courts should refrain from extending CALEA to
apply in this case.87
The government argued that CALEA does not forbid the court’s
order compelling Apple to provide reasonable assistance for several
reasons.88 First, the government argued that CALEA does not “me-
ticulously, intricately, or specifically” address when a court may
require a private company such as Apple to help the government
bypass encryption software, and therefore did not specifically ad-
dress the matter at hand.89 The government argued that the AWA
applies as long as there is no statute that explicitly controls, which is
the case here. The government stated, “It is not enough for other
laws to brush up against similar issues. Rather, Congress must legis-
late so ‘intricately’ as to leave ‘no gap to fill.”90 Because of this
silence or gap in the law, the government claimed that an order
under the AWA was appropriate to compel Apple to provide assis-
tance.91 The government also argued that CALEA only limits the
authority of law enforcement agencies and not courts.92 Indeed, the
government argued, “The Order rests not on CALEA, but on the
AWA . . . .”93 Finally, the government noted that CALEA only ap-
plies to data “in motion.”94 Data in motion is a phrase used for data
that is in transit, especially via telephone or the Internet.95 Gener-
ally, data that is still being transmitted is considered in motion,
86. In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant
Issued by This Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 350 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2016).
87. Motion to Vacate, supra note 35, at 17.
88. Government’s Reply in Support of Motion to Compel & Opposition to Apple Inc.’s
Motion to Vacate Order at 10, In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During
the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate
35KGD203, No. 15-0451 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Government’s Reply].
89. Id. at 11.
90. Id. at 10–11 (quoting The Company v. United States, 349 F.3d 1132, 1145 n.26 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
91. See id. at 11.
92. Id. at 11–12.
93. Id. at 12.
94. Government’s Motion to Compel Apple Inc. to Comply with this Court’s February
16, 2016 Order Compelling Assistance in Search at 22, In re Search of an Apple iPhone
Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License
Plate 35KGD203, No. CM 16-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Government’s Motion
to Compel].
95. See THOMPSON & JAIKARAN, supra note 22, at 2–3.
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whereas data that is stored on a device and no longer being trans-
mitted is consider at rest. According to the government, because it
sought data that was stored on a device and no longer being trans-
ferred (data at rest), the plain text of CALEA does not apply.96 The
government argued that whether Apple is an information service
provider as defined by the statute is irrelevant because the statue
only applies to data in motion.97  The government stated, “Put sim-
ply, CALEA is entirely inapplicable to the present dispute and does
not limit this Court’s authority under the All Writs Act to require
Apple to assist the government in executing a search warrant.”98
It is unclear whether or not CALEA directly applies to the matter
at hand. According to Magistrate Judge Orenstein—a United States
Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of New York who ruled on
another similar matter involving the FBI and Apple—it is arguable
whether or not CALEA explicitly prohibits the government from
compelling companies like Apple to assist it.99 It does at least seem
to be clear that because the data in question is at rest rather than in
motion, the plain text of CALEA does not explicitly prohibit the
government from compelling Apple to assist it in its investigation
with a court order pursuant to the AWA.
2. The All Writs Act of 1789
In the several cases in which the government has demanded the
assistance of private companies to bypass device encryption, it has
primarily relied on the authority of the AWA of 1789.100 The AWA
states, “The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law.”101 The statute grants federal courts the authority to issue
orders when three criteria are met:
1. Issuance of the writ must be dq;in aid of” the issuing court’s
jurisdiction;
2. The type of writ requested must be “necessary or appropri-
ate” to provide such aid to the issuing court’s jurisdiction; and
96. Government’s Motion to Compel, supra note 94, at 23.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant
Issued by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
100. THOMPSON & JAIKARAN, supra note 22, at 16.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
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3. The issuance of the writ must be “agreeable to the usages
and principles of law.”
If an application under the AWA meets all three of those require-
ments, the court “may” issue the requested writ in exercise of its
discretion—but it is never required to do so.102
After a court has determined that the statutory requirements of
the AWA have been met, it may then consider the discretionary fac-
tors laid out by the Supreme Court in United States v. New York
Telephone Company.103 In N.Y. Tel. Co., the Court ruled that a private
telephone company could be required to install pen registers (sur-
veillance devices that record outgoing phone numbers when
dialed) in order to assist the government in thwarting criminal ac-
tivity.104 In that case, the Court ruled that three discretionary factors
should be taken into account when considering an application pur-
suant to the AWA: (1) “the closeness of the relationship between
the person or entity to whom the proposed writ is directed and the
matter over which the court has jurisdiction”; (2) “the reasonable-
ness of the burden to be imposed on the writ’s subject”; and (3)
“the necessity of the requested writ to aid the court’s jurisdiction
(which does not replicate the second statutory element, despite the
overlapping language).”105 The requirements of the AWA itself
seem fairly straightforward, but the constitutionality of the govern-
ment’s use of the AWA still must be scrutinized.
B. Constitutionality of Deployment of the AWA
The courts have made several rulings regarding the constitution-
ality of the AWA. In Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States
Marshals Service, the Supreme Court ruled that “[t]he All Writs Act
is a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise
covered by statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the partic-
ular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that
is controlling.”106  Earlier, in Plum Creek Lumber Company v. Hutton,
the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he All Writs Act is not a grant of
plenary power to the federal courts . . . . It does not authorize a
court to order a party to bear risks not otherwise demanded by law,
102. In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 350.
103. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977).
104. Id. at 178–79.
105. In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 351.
106. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
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or to aid the government in conducting a more efficient investiga-
tion, when other forms are available.”107
Finally, according to Magistrate Judge Orenstein, the AWA may
be appropriately used “to fill in a statutory gap that Congress has
failed to consider, [but] it cannot be used to grant the government
authority Congress chose not to confer.” Judge Orenstein ex-
plained as follows:
But if CALEA, considered in the context of a larger statu-
tory scheme, does not erect such a barrier to relief on its own
terms, then the Application turns on whether the gap in the
laws the AWA fills is, as the government argues, the entire
space between authorizing statutes and legislative prohibitions
or if, as Apple would have it, it only reaches to such legislative
powers as Congress has not considered and either adopted or
rejected.108
The question is whether Congress’s inaction reflects a purposeful
choice not to authorize the courts to compel information service
providers to provide assistance to the government or if it is simply
congressional oversight.
1. First Amendment Implications
One constitutional concern this use of the AWA raises is freedom
of expression via software code. It might be the case that by forcing
companies to write specific software code, the government is com-
pelling speech and therefore violating the First Amendment of the
Constitution. In Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc. v. Federal Communi-
cations Commission, the Supreme Court ruled that government
actions that “compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing
a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny” as
laws restricting speech.109 In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of
North Carolina, Inc., the Supreme Court held that compelled speech
is a “content-based regulation of speech” subject to strict scrutiny.110
In Junger v. Daley, the Sixth Circuit ruled that “[b]ecause computer
source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information
107. Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 1979).
108. In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant
Issued by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
109. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
110. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1987).
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and ideas about computer programming, we hold that it is pro-
tected by the First Amendment.”111 Finally, in Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, the Second Circuit determined that computer code is
treated as speech with regard to the First Amendment.112
Apple and the technology industry leaders argue that these cases
applied together require the courts to view the government’s action
under a strict scrutiny basis. They argue that the government is reg-
ulating code, which is content-based speech, and that by
compelling private companies to write specific code, the govern-
ment is violating those companies’ First Amendment rights.113
The government, on the other hand, contends that the code it is
requesting is functional in nature rather than expressive and there-
fore does not receive the full protection of the First Amendment.114
The government relies on the Court’s holding in Universal City Stu-
dios v. Corley that “solely functional code ‘is not within the meaning
of the First Amendment.’”115 The government also claims that
based on the holding in Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. Federal
Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969), “software that
is automatic and is to be used in an entirely mechanical way is not
speech under the First Amendment.”116
In the San Bernardino case, the government argues that based
on the aforementioned cases, the Court should analyze motions to
compel companies to create new software under an intermediate
scrutiny test. Therefore “so long as the regulation services a substan-
tial government interest [,] the interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression and any incidental restrictions on
speech must not burden substantially more speech than is necessary
to further that interest.”117 The government asserts that its interest
in obtaining the code is to thwart terrorist threats, which is both
substantial and does not relate to the suppression of speech, and
111. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000).
112. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449 (2d Cir. 2001).
113. Motion to Vacate, supra note 35, at 32–34.
114. Government’s Reply, supra note 88, at 31–34; see also Brief for Greg Clayborn et al. as
Amici Curiae at 18–19, In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the
Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203,
No. 5:16-cm-00010-SP, at 19 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Brief for Greg Clayborn et
al.].
115. Brief for Greg Clayborn et al., supra note 114, at 18 (quoting Universal City Studios
v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 454 (2d Cir. 2001)).
116. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 111 (2d
Cir. 2000)).
117. Id. at 18.
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that it does not incidentally burden any speech unnecessarily be-
cause there is no other way the government can bypass the
companies’ encryptions.118
2. Fifth Amendment Implications
Another constitutional concern raised by this use of the AWA is
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process. In the
San Bernardino case, Apple argued the government violated its sub-
stantive due process right to be free from “arbitrary deprivation of
its liberty by government.”119 Apple relied on the ruling in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis,120 in which the Court stated, “We have empha-
sized time and again that ‘[t]he touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government,’
. . . [including] the exercise of power without any reasonable justifi-
cation in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.”121
The government responded that “Apple must also show that such
deprivation was ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.’”122 The government argued that this cannot be the case
because its actions have a substantial relation to public safety and
general welfare since it is using the information to conduct an FBI
investigation aimed at thwarting future terrorist attempts and ap-
prehending any accomplices to the attack.
3. There is No Fourth Amendment Argument123
At first glance, the government decrypting people’s personal de-
vices may seem to raise Fourth Amendment issues, but that is not
the case. Although encryption is created to address its users’ per-
sonal privacy concerns, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
an unlawful search and seizure does not apply here. Indeed, when
118. Id. at 8.
119. Motion to Vacate, supra note 35, at 34.
120. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998).
121. Id. (internal citations omitted).
122. Brief for Greg Clayborn et al., supra note 114, at 17 (quoting Sinaloa Lake Owners
Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 864 F.2d 1475, 1484 (9th Cir. 1989)).
123. As explained below in this Part, privacy would normally be included as a Fourth
Amendment issue in Part II with the other constitutional concerns, but because the AWA
requires a search warrant and thereby almost certainly complies with Fourth Amendment,
the claim is listed here as more of a practical concern than a legal one. See THOMPSON &
JAIKARAN, supra note 22, at 16 n.113.
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discussing the San Bernardino case, City University of New York
(CUNY) School of Law Professor Ruthann Robson briefly ad-
dressed the issue stating that, “Interestingly, there is no Fourth
Amendment argument.”124
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures and requires a judicially sanctioned warrant supported by
probable cause before a search or seizure can be conducted.125 The
AWA requires a search warrant be obtained before a court can
grant any motion pursuant to the statute.126 Because the govern-
ment must first obtain a search warrant before using the authority
of the AWA to obtain a motion to compel private companies to as-
sist it, the Fourth Amendment requirements have been satisfied.127
According to a Congressional Research Report, “Since the govern-
ment obtained a valid probable cause warrant in this case, Apple is
not contesting the search of the device under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Thus, any privacy interest involved must derive from some
other constitutional, statutory, or extra-constitutional source.”128
The matter at hand poses little threat to individual privacy rights
because, in order for the AWA to be utilized, the government must
first obtain a search warrant and therefore establish probable cause,
which satisfies the Fourth Amendment.129 There are, of course, still
privacy concerns in the sense that individuals have an interest in
having their data protected, but there is no Fourth Amendment
claim.
As exemplified by these arguments, courts struggle to determine
what statutes to apply, how to apply them, and whether such appli-
cations violate the constitution. The current statutory framework
provides less than clear guidance on balancing the needs of compa-
nies and the government in an area of continual technological
advancements and pervasive tension between security and privacy.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that these cases are gener-
ally very fact-specific and technical, making it difficult for courts to
apply the law consistently and in a way that takes into account the
various interests involved.
124. Ruthann Robson, Apple Responds to Order to “Unlock” IPhone, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PROF BLOG (Feb. 25, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2016/02/apple-re
sponds-to-order-to-unlock-iphone.html.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
126. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
127. See Brief for Greg Clayborn et al., supra note 114, at 10–11.
128. THOMPSON & JAIKARAN, supra note 22, at 16 n.113.
129. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating “but upon probable cause . . .”).
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III. REFORMS AND SOLUTIONS
The conflicting interests of the need for increasingly stronger en-
crypted devices and of the government to thwart cybercrimes
cannot be reconciled within the current system. The Apple case
highlights how complex these issues can be, as well as how difficult
it can be for a court to determine the proper outcome of these
cases. Without reform, the Going Dark problem and cybercrime
will continue to plague private actors and the government alike.
This Part will first describe why the judicial branch is not the proper
branch to solve issues of this kind. This Part will then propose that
Congress should create an agency capable of addressing these con-
cerns more nimbly than Congress and with more accuracy than the
courts. Finally, this Part will address potential criticisms of the pro-
posed law reform.
A. The Courts Alone Are Not the Proper Branch for Determining the
Outcomes of These Situations
1. Congress is Better Equipped to Handle these Issues than the
Judicial Branch
The judicial branch is not the branch best equipped to deter-
mine the outcome of compelled decryption cases. Rather, Congress
should use its power to create an administrative body uniquely
suited to handling Digital Security issues. There are three primary
reasons the courts are not well equipped to determine the outcome
of these issues: (1) the issue is one of public policy; (2) the issue
involves extremely complicated and ever-changing technology; and
(3) the courts are limited to applying antiquated or ill-suited law.
First, to arrive at a sensible result, the decision maker must, in
each case, make a holistic ruling by taking into account issues such
as national security, public safety, data security, individual privacy,
innovation, and corporate competitiveness.130 The courts are not
the proper venue to balance these interests, as they are limited to
considering the interests of parties involved and the relevant law at
the time. This decision will affect every person, corporation, and
government entity that uses encryption software. It is well-estab-
lished that the legislative branch is the preferable governmental
branch to determine issues that primarily concern public policy.131
130. See Digital Security Commission Act, H.R. 4651, 115th Cong. § 12 (2016).
131. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Congress is Best to Decide the Apple-FBI case, THE COM. APPEAL
(Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.commercialappeal.com/opinion/national/noah-feldman-con
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Unlike the judicial branch, the legislative branch can utilize tools
such as appointing committees, inviting and considering public dis-
course and lobbying, amending statutes, and—as this Note
advocates—delegating responsibilities to administrative bodies.132
Indeed, according to one constitutional and international law pro-
fessor at Harvard Law School, Noah Feldman, “courts that are
pretty good at interpreting statutes or applying the Constitution
generally aren’t very good at identifying and weighing major do-
mestic and international public policy consequences . . . . In the
U.S. system, Congress is supposed to make difficult public policy
decisions.”133 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha
noted that Congress is uniquely suited to make laws because of the
Framers’ decision “that the legislative power of the Federal Govern-
ment be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered procedure.”134
Second, the technological aspects of these matters are extremely
complicated and rapidly evolving, such that the courts will not be
able to keep pace. Indeed, several leaders in the technology indus-
try collectively stated that “[i]n light of rapidly evolving technology
and its tremendous social benefits, Congress is better suited to con-
front the issues here.”135 Congress has the power to call upon
experts, create committees, hear from various lobbyists, and ad-
dress situations without needing to wait for a party to file a claim.
Unlike the courts, Congress is able to take into account factors
outside of the case at hand and weigh the benefits and harms to the
public at large, whereas the courts are limited to only considering
the parties directly involved and the applicable statutes.
The aforementioned Eastern District of New York Apple case
demonstrates that the legislative branch is better equipped than a
court to determine the outcomes of these issues. In that case, Judge
Orenstein’s ruling was that none of the factors—the closeness of
Apple to the matter, the burdensomeness on Apple, or the neces-
sity of Apple’s assistance—were such that it justified imposing the
obligation to assist the government’s investigation on Apple against
its will. The problem is that none of the considerations in that anal-
ysis concern legal matters; they are all matters of fact, many of
gress-is-best-to-decide-the-apple-fbi-case-2c76ea7e-ff9a-6dd8-e053-0100007fb85b-369913001.
html.
132. See generally The Legislative Process: Overview, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/legislative-process (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
133. Feldman, supra note 131.
134. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (empha-
sis added).
135. See Brief of Amici Curiae 1, supra note 8, at 10.
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which deal with complex technological issues. For example, the
burdensomeness factor would require the court to take into ac-
count all of the aspects involved with creating new software such as
the cost of paying engineers to do so, the difficulty of accomplish-
ing such a task, the equipment needed to complete it and the
difficulty of acquiring said equipment, whether such a task would
require moving to or even building a new facility, and many other
considerations. As is evidenced by Judge Orenstein’s ruling, techno-
logical facts are often the determining factors in these cases.136
Such factors can be extremely complicated, especially when dealing
with software code, encryption software, backdoors, and other tech-
nological issues.137 Given this complexity, experts are increasingly
needed to determine the correct results of these cases. Congress is
better equipped to deal with this issue because it can—and
should—create an administrative body with experts in the field to
more accurately determine the correct outcome of these cases. Fur-
thermore, because of the ever-changing landscape of technology,
courts will always have the problem of being limited by legislation
that will continue to become outdated. In a brief supporting Apple
in the San Bernardino case, several security and cryptography ex-
perts stated, “The AWA’s authority to issue writs to non-parties
simply does not account for the public-security dangers this Court’s
Order creates, nor the future risks that future orders will also pose.
The plain language of the statute creates no obligations and gives
no guidance to courts considering the very important and techno-
logically nuanced underlying security risks associated with
mandating forensic access to private data.”138
While courts are limited to applying current legislation, Congress
is the sole branch authorized to “update a technologically anti-
quated statute to address the new and rapidly evolving era of
computer and cloud-stored, processed and produced data.”139 It is
worth noting that Congress is, however, also limited because each
time it passes legislation it will quickly become outdated. Thus, the
need for the creation of an administrative body is clear. Digital se-
curity technology grows at such a rate that the only way to
136. In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant
Issued by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 355–63 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
137. See generally id.
138. Brief for iPhone Security and Applied Cryptography Experts as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Apple, Inc.’s Motion’s to Vacate Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance at 22, In re Matter of
the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black
Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2016).
139. Motion to Vacate, supra note 35, at 18.
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effectively regulate it is to create a living, breathing administrative
body that can make rules and decisions quickly and accurately
enough to keep up with it.
Third, there is a clear lack of legislation, and, thus, the courts do
not have sufficient tools to correctly determine the outcome of
cases. For example, in the San Bernardino case, the only applicable
statutes were CALEA, which may or may not apply, and the AWA,
which is supposed to be used only as a gap-filler. It seems inconceiv-
able that courts should be forced to determine issues pertaining to
the latest encryption software protocols of 2016 and beyond armed
with only a gap-filling statute written in 1789. Furthermore, accord-
ing to Professor Feldman, “As written, the laws governing the
granting of warrants don’t provide sufficient latitude for a court to
weigh the dangers of requiring [private companies such as] Apple
to write new code against the corresponding gains for policing and
national security.”140 Finally, beyond the fact that Congress is better
equipped to solve this issue, relying on the courts to do so violates
the separation of powers doctrine.
2. Allowing the Courts to Determine this Matter Forces them to
Violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine
It is well established that courts may not exercise the legislative
power by repurposing statutes to meet the evolving needs of soci-
ety.141 Allowing the courts to determine the outcomes of these
cases, given the lack of legislation and strong public policy conse-
quences, puts them in a situation in which they are responsible for
weighing the aforementioned various interests and essentially de-
termining an extremely important issue of public policy. The courts
are being put in a position where they are essentially functioning as
the legislature, which constitutes a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine.142 Indeed, in Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that courts should not make rulings that are, at bottom,
“political questions.”143 The Court enumerated several factors to
140. Feldman, supra note 131.
141. Robson, supra note 124 (citing Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 391 (2005) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)).
142. The separation of powers doctrine is a “political doctrine of constitutional law under
which the three branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) are kept sepa-
rate to prevent abuse of power. Also known as the system of checks and balances, each
branch is given certain powers so as to check and balance the other branches.” Separation of
Powers, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/separation_of_powers (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2016).
143. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–11 (1962).
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use in determining whether a question is a political question, in-
cluding whether there is an “impossibility of deciding [the issue]
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudi-
cial discretion.”144 Courts determining this issue would have to
decide if and when the government can compel private companies
to assist it in investigations, which should constitute a “initial policy
determination” as defined in Baker. Such policy determinations are
better left to Congress.145
The need for new clarifying legislation is clear. The reason there
is so much debate about this issue is because Congress has not
made a clear legislative decision, hence the argument about
whether the AWA may be used to fill the missing gaps in these situa-
tions.146 Thus, the courts are put in a position where they must
attempt to make the law by making rulings with limited statutory
guidance and to potentially give new meaning to statutes instead of
allowing Congress to update antiquated legislation or adopt new
legislation.147  Indeed, Apple convincingly argued, “[Avoiding pub-
lic debate] seems fundamentally inconsistent with the proposition
that such important policy issues should be determined in the first
instance by the legislative branch after public debate—as opposed
to having them decided by the judiciary in sealed, ex parte
proceedings.”148
Finally, in INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court held that “Congress
has plenary authority in all cases in which it has substantive legisla-
tive jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not
offend some other constitutional restriction.”149 The fact that Con-
gress has already grappled issues of encryption and digital security
with legislation such as CALEA demonstrates that Congress has the
authority and indeed the duty to solve this issue.
144. See id. at 217; Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941
(1983).
145. Feldman, supra note 131.
146. See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant
Issued by This Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 353 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2016) (Judge Orenstein
noted there is some gap which Congress has not addressed, and that the question at hand is
to determine whether the AWA can fill that gap).
147. While it is difficult to prove, the government might very well be attempting to “short-
circuit public debate on this controversy,” as Apple claims, by using the courts, which should
raise suspicion of an attempt to violate the separation of powers doctrine. In re Order Re-
quiring Apple Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by the Court, 2015
WL 5920207, at *3 n.1.
148. In re Order Requiring Apple Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant
Issued by the Court, 2015 WL 5920207, at *3 n.1.
149. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
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B. Solution
In order to correctly balance the many and heavily-weighted
competing interests revolving around the issue of device encryp-
tion, Congress should enact a statute that creates an administrative
agency with both rulemaking and adjudication powers pertaining
to digital security, including encryption. An administrative adjudi-
cative agency could solve these problems because it would not be
constrained by many of the problems the courts and Congress face.
In February 2016, several members of Congress introduced the Dig-
ital Security Commission Act of 2016 for the purpose of creating a
temporary national encryption panel.150 The bill has only been in-
troduced in the House of Representatives and, according to
LexisNexis Bill Tracking, the bill has a “low chance to pass to the
next stage.”151 Even if this bill were to pass, the Agency proposed in
this Note (referred to as the “Digital Security Agency”)  is unique in
that, although it would seek to accomplish many of the same goals
as the Digital Security Commission, it would go further than this bill
does and would accomplish its goals by granting the agency power
to make decisions. The Digital Security Commission Act of 2016
contains several useful ideas, however, it does not provide the na-
tional encryption panel any power to make decisions, and instead
only serves to make periodic reports to Congress to advise it about
the various benefits and risks associated with encryption technol-
ogy. The Digital Security Agency would seek to accomplish many of
the goals enumerated in Digital Security Commission Act of 2016,
but instead of creating a panel, it would create an adjudicative
agency that could hold hearings and make rulings rather than sim-
ply advise Congress. The statute this Note proposes would go much
further than the Digital Security Commission Act by granting the
agency the power to not only consult with experts in the field to
make rules, but also to make adjudicative decisions to react to these
situations more nimbly than Congress and with more resources
than the courts. Finally, the Digital Security Agency would also be
responsible for making periodic recommendations to Congress so
that, in the event new legislation is needed, Congress will be better
informed to respond.
150. Digital Security Commission Act, H.R. 4651, 115th Cong. (2016).
151. Digital Security Commission Act of 2016, 114 Bill Tracking H.R. 4651, https://ad
vance.lexis.com/document/documentlink/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=07a7d614-57d5-4892-
897d-c8313624edd8&pdlinktype=document&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2F
statutes-legislation%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5J6K-R3K1-JCTT-01WM-00000-00&pdcon
tentcomponentid=7425&action=linkdoc&ecomp=-9zdk&prid=22264b76-524f-4a1e-b980-9fb
708a35770.
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The Digital Security Agency would accomplish the purpose enu-
merated in the Digital Security Commission Act, but would have
additional powers to accomplish these goals. The mission of the
Digital Security Commission Act of 2016 is as follows:
To bring together leading experts and practitioners from the
technology sector, cryptography, law enforcement, intelli-
gence, the privacy and civil liberties community, global
commerce and economics, and the national security commu-
nity to examine the intersection of security and digital security
and communications technology in a systematic, holistic way,
and determine the implications for national security, public
safety, data security, privacy, innovation, and American com-
petitiveness in the global marketplace.152
The Digital Security Agency would have two ways to make policy
and two corresponding branches: an adjudication branch and a
rulemaking branch. The adjudication branch would be responsible
for holding adjudicatory hearings and making orders when the gov-
ernment seeks to compel private actors to assist it in its
investigations. The rulemaking branch would be responsible for
conducting research and consulting experts, private companies and
the government in order to make rules and recommendations to
Congress. By utilizing the two separate branches, the Agency would
be more nimble than Congress, and more accurate than the courts.
1. The Adjudication Branch
The Digital Security Agency would have the power to hold hear-
ings to determine on a case-by-case basis whether or not the
government could—after obtaining a search warrant issued by a
court—proceed to compel a third party to assist in decryption ef-
forts. Essentially, law enforcement would have to first obtain a
normal search warrant by showing probable cause. After having ob-
tained a search warrant, if law enforcement found it was unable to
decrypt a device, network, or other digital source, it would file a
claim to the Digital Security Agency that would in turn adjudicate
the matter between law enforcement and the private company. In
other words, the Digital Security Agency’s primary responsibility
would be to respond when law enforcement encounters the Going
Dark problem.
152. Digital Security Commission Act, H.R. 4651, 115th Cong. § 3(b) (2016).
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The adjudication branch should be comprised of an odd number
of qualified administrative law judges.153 In addition to the adminis-
trative law judges, there should be a council of experts to advise the
judges on matters of fact. The council of experts should have mem-
bers from the following areas: “(1) cryptography (2) global
commerce and economics (3) federal law enforcement (4) state
and local law enforcement (5) consumer-facing technology sector
(6) enterprise technology sector (7) the intelligence community
(8) the privacy and civil liberties community.”154 There should also
be at least one member nominated by an interest group in support
of private companies such as the Software Alliance155 or the Infor-
mation Technology Industry Council.156 The council of experts
would have no power to make the final rulings, however the admin-
istrative law judges should be advised to strongly consider the
opinions of these experts when determining the outcomes of these
matters. If the adjudicative branch determines by a simple majority
that the government is entitled to compel a private company to pro-
vide assistance, it would issue an order stating that the company has
to comply. The order would have the same effect as if a normal
court granted a motion to compel a company to provide assistance.
Companies could appeal this order to a federal court of appeals,
but only on the grounds of a constitutional violation.
The enabling act should advise the administrative law judges to
consider the factors laid out by Judge Orenstein: the closeness of
the private company’s relationship to the underlying criminal con-
duct and government investigation; the burden the requested
order would impose on the private company; and the necessity of
imposing such a burden on the private company.157 In addition, the
enabling act should advise the adjudication branch to consider the
probability that decrypting the device in question would lead to
thwarting a crime or solving an investigation. The enabling act
153. “The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) function was created by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) in 1946 to ensure fairness in administrative proceedings before Federal
Government agencies.” Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, U.S. OF-
FICE OF PERS. MGMT, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-qualifications
/general-schedule-qualification-standards/specialty-areas/administrative-law-judge-po
sitions/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Qualification Standard].
154. Digital Security Commission Act, H.R. 4651, 115th Cong. § 4(b) (2016).
155. See generally THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, http://www.bsa.org/ (last visited Oct. 29,
2016) [hereinafter THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE].
156. See generally INFO. TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL, https://www.itic.org/ (last visited Oct. 29,
2016) [hereinafter INFO. TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL].
157. In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant
Issued by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
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should, however, give the agency discretion to consider other fac-
tors, as new factors will almost certainly arise as technology
advances. The orders the Digital Security Agency makes should be
binding on the Agency itself so that it has to follow precedent, un-
less the rulemaking branch creates a rule that effectively overrules a
decision. In the event new discoveries are made that have a substan-
tial effect on a ruling the court has already made, the rulemaking
branch would be responsible for creating a new rule to address the
concern. This way, the adjudicative branch will ensure predictable
results, but will also have the ability to quickly adapt to the ever-
changing landscape of digital security.
The adjudicative branch is necessary to the agency because, while
the rulemaking branch can conduct research and use notice and
comment rulemaking, there must still be a method for the govern-
ment to obtain an order compelling a private company to assist it.
Regardless of how comprehensive the rules are, there will almost
certainly be some disputes that must be resolved by an adjudicator.
Furthermore, because technology changes so often, there will al-
most certainly be disputes for which there is no applicable rule. The
adjudication branch will also be instructive for the rulemaking
branch, which can compile adjudicative rulings into comprehensive
rules. The adjudicative branch is essential to the agency’s ability to
respond to disputes as they arise, and the panel of experts and the
preference given to administrative law judges with some relevant
expertise will lead to more accurate decisions than the courts could
make.
2. The Rulemaking Branch
The primary responsibilities of the rulemaking branch would be
to promulgate rules under the APA via notice and comment
rulemaking pursuant to APA §553, and to provide periodic reports
to Congress.158 This branch would be responsible for providing no-
tice, the opportunity to comment, and publication of all rules with
a general statement of basis and purpose of all rules adopted as
proscribed by APA §553.159 By using notice and comment rulemak-
ing, the agency will be able to more accurately ascertain the
interests and concerns of those who will be affected by the rules.
Rules made by this branch should be used by the adjudication
158. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966).
159. Id.
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branch in its rulings. This branch would also be responsible for sub-
mitting semi-annual reports to Congress detailing: (1) all agency
action since the preceding report; (2) issues or controversies the
agency believes present a problem or will become problematic in
the foreseeable future; (3) an assessment of the most immediate
and dangerous cyber security threats and potential methods to
solve them; and (4) any information not specifically stated the
agency believes is relevant and important.
This branch should be comprised of at least nine members for
the purposes of making rules and sending reports to Congress re-
garding digital security and encryption. Like the panel of experts in
the adjudicative branch, the rulemaking branch should be required
to have at least one member with expertise in each of the following
areas: “(1) Cryptography (2) Global commerce and economics (3)
Federal law enforcement (4) State and local law enforcement (5)
Consumer-facing technology sector (6) Enterprise technology sec-
tor (7) The intelligence community (8) The privacy and civil
liberties community,”160 as well as a member with some federal law-
making experience. There should also be at least one member
nominated by an interest group in support of private companies
such as the Software Alliance161 or the Information Technology In-
dustry Council.162 This highly qualified team would be more
informed than the average member of Congress, and could create
rules more quickly because it would not be burdened by the proce-
dures Congress must follow to pass bills.
The rulemaking branch provides the ideal mechanism for
quickly making rules while considering all of the competing inter-
ests. First, the rulemaking branch will almost certainly lead to better
rules than Congress alone could create. By utilizing notice and
comment rulemaking, the branch will allow for greater public input
into the decision, thereby ensuring the agency is adequately in-
formed of all competing interests. This branch also will allow for
more comprehensive decision making than the adjudicative
branch. The rulemaking branch will also benefit the agency be-
cause it will be able to impose comprehensive rules at once on all
similarly situated parties, as opposed to the adjudicative branch,
which will be limited rulings on the parties involved in hearings.
The qualified officers of the rulemaking branch will able to foresee
problems before claims arise in some cases and will therefore be
able to create rules the adjudicative branch can apply in the event
160. Digital Security Commission Act, H.R. 4651, 115th Cong. § 4(b) (2016).
161. See generally THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 155.
162. See generally INFO. TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL, supra note 156.
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that such a claim is eventually brought; this will decrease the likeli-
hood that the adjudicative branch will have to “stretch” a rule to
apply to a situation or give a rule new meaning, and will lead to
more predictive outcomes. Finally, because rules must be published
as soon as they are promulgated, regulated parties will have ad-
vance knowledge of their legal duties and can design their digital
security protocols accordingly. Thus, the rulemaking branch is es-
sential to the efficiency and comprehensiveness of the agency as a
whole.
3. Appointment and Removal
The enabling act should specify that members for both the adju-
dicative branch and the rulemaking branch should be appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, pursuant
to the Appointments Clause. In order to be selected to serve as an
administrative law judge, candidates should be required to meet all
the qualifications enumerated by the APA.163 Special preference
should be given to candidates who also have expertise in one of the
aforementioned relevant areas of expertise. The enabling act
should also restrict the removal of administrative officials and ad-
ministrative law judges to “good cause” to insulate the agency from
political pressure as much as possible.164 Finally, in the event of a
vacancy in any position, that member should be replaced in the
same manner in which he or she was appointed.
C. Potential Criticisms of the Agency Approach
Critics of the agency approach will likely argue that the courts
are in fact better equipped than an administrative agency because
courts are better at upholding constitutional rights, which consti-
tutes an equal if not greater concern than the potential public
policy consequences. In Marbury v. Madison, the Court established
that all cases arising under the Constitution are to be reviewed by
the judicial branch.165 The Court also stated, “It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
163. Qualification Standard, supra note 153.
164. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988) (citing 28 U.S.C.S. § 596(a)(1))
(Court upheld the Independent Counsel Act, in which a prosecutor appointed to conduct an
investigation who alleged wrong-doing by officials could be removed only for good cause).
165. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 153 (1803).
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is.”166 Critics may also argue that, oftentimes, agencies do not live
up to expectations and fall short of the large responsibilities they
are given. Particularly because of the high volume of anticipated
cases and issues in the future, critics will likely be skeptical that this
agency will be able to handle all of its responsibilities.
Admittedly, there are constitutional concerns and questions of
law involved in some of these cases, but the proposed agency ap-
proach takes this into account by recommending that the agency
include administrative law judges. The Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946 was created to establish the administrative law judge
function to “[e]nsure fairness in administrative proceedings before
Federal Government Agencies.”167 The inclusion of administrative
law judges would help to ensure that the agency correctly and fairly
interprets issues of law. Furthermore, the inclusion of people with
federal law making experience in the rulemaking branch will de-
crease the likelihood that any unlawful rules are created. Given that
administrative law judges are as qualified as ordinary judges, there
is no reason to believe the agency will not correctly and fairly deter-
mine laws and avoid making rulings contrary to the letter and spirit
of the Constitution. Furthermore, there are plenty of other agen-
cies already in place that make rules and regulations that relate to
constitutional and legal concerns and are highly effective. There is
no reason to believe that this agency would be less effective than
the many successful agencies that are essential to the United States
government.
Furthermore, all of the rules and decisions the agency makes can
be reviewed by courts or overruled by a statute passed by Congress.
Under the proposed agency approach, in the event that a party be-
lieves its constitutional rights have been violated, that party can
always appeal the agency’s rulings. In such a situation, the proposed
agency would have still served its purpose, as the only appeals would
be decisions in which there is a potential constitutional violation
and not those revolving around the public policy concerns of
encryption.
The ability of agencies with adjudicative judges to succeed where
the courts have failed has been well documented, as exemplified by
agencies such as the NLRB, which has been successfully engaging in
adjudicatory and rulemaking activities for over 80 years.168 While
166. Id. at 177.
167. Qualification Standard, supra note 153.
168. See generally National Labor Relations Board: 80 Years of Protecting Employee Rights, NAT’L
LABOR RELATIONS BD. (2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-
page/node-1536/NLRB%2080th%20Anniversary.pdf (illustrating the 80-year history and
success of the National Labor Relations Board). Furthermore, according to scholars such as
524 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:2
the agency approach may be imperfect, given the nature and the
difficulty of the issue, it seems to be a far superior approach than
forcing the courts to determine the outcome of these matters with
little to no legislative guidance.
CONCLUSION
Many believe that the question of reconciling competing encryp-
tion and digital security interests is one without an easy answer, and
they are correct. The complexity of the situation and the interests
at stake provide all the more reason for Congress to create an ad-
ministrative agency to conduct trials as new issues arise and advise
Congress on potential legislation for the future. If correctly imple-
mented, the agency approach will ultimately provide the nation
with the best policy for moving forward while simultaneously pro-
tecting the interests of national and digital security, privacy and
public safety.
Michael L. Wachter, Professor of Law and Economics at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, “the NLRB has been largely successful and in one key area exceedingly successful.”
Michael L. Wachter, The Striking Success of the National Labor Relations Act, in PENN LAW LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY, RESEARCH HANDBOOKS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 427 (Cynthia L. Es-
tlund ed., 2012). According to the Board, “The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has
counted millions of votes, investigated hundreds of thousands of unfair labor practice
charges, and issued thousands of decisions.” Graphs & Data, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data (last visited Oct. 29, 2016). Other exam-
ples of successful adjudicative agencies with rulemaking authority include the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the United States Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
